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Abstract 
This article queries the effects of international police assistance in the Global South, focusing 
specifically on Brazil. Utilising recently declassified documents accessed in Washington, DC, 
this article shows how United States officials sought to intervene in Latin American politics 
through international police assistance to Brazil during the 1960s–1980s. The article 
considers the geopolitical motivations behind these programs and highlights the connections 
between international police assistance, weak democratic institutions in Latin America and 
legacies of authoritarian policing in the region. The academic objectives are twofold: to 
foreground debates that emphasise the need for Southern Criminological research 
perspectives and to explore the broader effects of international police assistance programs 
in the Global South. By drawing attention to these issues, the article contributes to studies of 
policing, politics and public security in contexts like Brazil, where extreme levels of everyday 
violence are a threat to democracy and human rights. 
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Introduction 
Since The Economist denounced him as ‘Latin America’s latest menace’ in September 2018, 
Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro has consistently remained in the international spotlight. 
Whether for his racist, homophobic or misogynist comments (The Economist 2018), or his 
promises to deliver a Pinochet-style ‘Shock Doctrine’ (Klein 2007) of neoliberal economic 
reforms, Bolsonaro is archetypal of far-right, authoritarian ‘anti-politicians’ who espouse their 
populist messages through social media. In the case of Brazil, what has called particular attention 
is Bolsonaro’s rhetoric of punitive crime fighting, arguing, for example, that police officers who 
kill while on duty should not face investigation. One of Bolsonaro’s key campaign promises was 
to reduce restrictions on gun ownership in Brazil and, similar to the United States (US), legalise 
capital punishment and allow for the torture and killings of terrorists and crime suspects 
(Escobar 2018). The US has remained a consistent reference point for Bolsonaro, earning him the 
nickname ‘Tropical Trump’ for his open admiration of the US president, as well as his hard-line 
stance on public security. 
 
With his adulation of the US and US-style public security measures, Bolsonaro joins many other 
Latin American leaders who have sought to align more closely with the US. Such developments 
are hardly new and match historical trends where right-leaning politicians in Latin America (and 
elsewhere in the Global South) have attempted to strengthen their connections with the US. 
Similarly, the US has a long history of building links with such leaders, whether for geopolitical 
reasons or, just as often, in pursuing US economic interests (Huggins 1998; McCann 1974). This 
legacy extends back to at least the 1820s in Latin America with the presidency of James Monroe 
and has remained a key focus of academic research for decades (Cupples 2013). 
 
Conversely, what has received little attention are the ways US intervention in Latin America has, 
in many instances, been facilitated through international police assistance programs. Although 
appeals for increased security and strict law enforcement are key issues for leaders like 
Bolsonaro seeking to build closer ties with the US—as well as US discourses of security and 
democracy that tend to justify US international engagement—historically, researchers have paid 
little attention to the ways international police assistance programs typically undergird US 
intervention in such contexts. In particular, while researchers have provided key insight into the 
ways that international police assistance facilitates the transfer of resources, knowledge and tools 
of best practice (Lemieux 2010), less focus has been on how these initiatives frequently connect 
to broader geopolitical agendas connecting the US to the Global South. 
 
The purpose of this article is to clarify this topic, highlighting how US intervention in countries 
like Brazil is frequently accompanied by international policing assistance measures. It builds on 
emergent research in the field of ‘Southern Criminology’ (Blaustein et al. 2018; Carrington et al. 
2016; Carrington et al. 2019b), examining the enduring legacy of power and knowledge 
asymmetries that shape policing and crime-control practices in the Global South. It begins with a 
focused overview of recent studies on international police assistance, highlighting the need for 
new research that considers points of intersection between public security initiatives, 
international technology and knowledge transfer, and geopolitical relationships linking Global 
North and South. It then considers the case of US–Brazil relations, foregrounding the ways that 
international police assistance has played a key role in mediating this relationship, including US 
intervention efforts in Latin America more generally. By utilising recently declassified documents 
made available through the Freedom of Information Act in the US, this article details how US 
involvement with Brazilian police forces helped to establish the Brazilian military dictatorship 
that held power from 1964–1985. The article then considers more contemporary shifts in 
rationalising international police assistance, from fighting communism to the war on drugs, 
including the transfer of more recent police assistance programs to combat narcotrafficking. It 
concludes by arguing that despite the Cold War ending and the redemocratisation in Brazil, US 
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influence continues to shape ideas and practices of policing and the politics of crime control, 
offering new insight into the emergence of political leaders like Bolsonaro. 
 
A Southern Criminology of Violence in Brazil: Considering International Police Assistance 
 
Acts of everyday violence are central to Brazil’s bleak social picture. Homicide rates have soared 
in recent decades, and today are nearly three times higher than they were during the country’s 
military dictatorship (1964–1985). In 2016, homicide rates reached 30.33/100,000 inhabitants 
(Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada 2016)—well above the UN’s threshold for chronic 
violence of 10/100,000 (Waiselfisz 2014). With more than 60,000 Brazilians murdered each year 
(Cerqueira et al. 2016), fear of crime and the practices of crime control agencies are increasingly 
important political issues. Central to these debates are questions of police use of force—whether 
police should combat public insecurity with even more violence, or whether police violence is a 
major part of the problem. During Brazil’s 2018 presidential campaign, candidates frequently 
returned to these questions, with crime data frequently used (and misused) to manipulate voters 
(Bolsonaro 2018; Londono and Darlington 2018). 
 
A growing body of academic literature has considered the relationships between violence and 
police abuse of force in Brazil (Alston 2008; Arias 2006; Chevigny 1995; Denyer Willis 2015; 
Garmany 2014; Huggins 2000; Pinheiro 1982). Political scientists and sociologists, in particular, 
have provided diverse understandings of Brazilian public security and criminal justice 
institutions, frequently representing them as chaotic and crisis-ridden (Caldeira 2000; Kant de 
Lima et al. 2000; Macaulay 2013; Misse 2011; Tavares dos Santos 2009; Wacquant 2003). 
Curiously, despite increasing attention from social scientists to questions of violence and policing 
in the Global South, critical criminologists have had little to say regarding the particularities of 
law and order in Brazil and other similar contexts. With few exceptions (Carrington et al. 2016; 
Darke 2013; Darke 2014; Macaulay 2007), criminologists have focused their analyses on 
countries in the Global North, with less attention paid to serious issues of violence and policing 
that tend to characterise countries like Brazil. 
 
This uneven production of knowledge is of growing concern to critical criminologists (Carrington 
et al. 2019b; Moosavi 2018). For example, in line with Connell’s (2007) critique of sociology and 
the need for more critical engagement with theories and empirical contexts in the Global South, 
Carrington et al. (2016) highlighted the need for criminologists to also reflect critically on recent 
postcolonial critiques in the social sciences. In particular, they call for research that better 
addresses patterns of crime specific to Southern countries (e.g. violence, policing and violent 
policing), and legacies of colonialism, imperialism and empire building that should not be ignored 
when considering Southern contexts. Policing and police violence are central to this research 
agenda, with scholars frequently noting key differences that must be accounted for when 
examining crime and public security in countries such as Brazil (Garmany 2011; Hautzinger 
2007). 
 
If the field of criminology can be critiqued for overlooking Southern countries and the uncritical 
application of Northern theories to the Global South, then so too has research into international 
police assistance focused disproportionately on Euro-American contexts or on exporting 
‘Northern’ models to ‘Southern’ contexts (c.f., Aitchison 2007; Bayley 2001). In Brazil and Latin 
America, this relates in large part to the impacts of international police assistance during the Cold 
War period, as well as the implementation of US models of crime control through the war on drugs 
and development of police reform initiatives. Recipes for justice reform, policing and crime 
control emerged predominantly in the US (Bayley 2001; Bratton 2005; Carrington et al. 2016), 
and were then emulated in countries like Brazil (Denyer Willis 2015; Jones and Newburn 2007; 
Macaulay 2007). This transfer of knowledge and policy failed to provide adequate crime-control 
strategies or account for local criminal justice realities, presuming that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policing 
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strategy could be implemented in the Global South (Huggins 1997; Macaulay 2007). To date, there 
remains a critical lack of research investigating the effects of international police assistance in 
Southern countries, including broader inquiries into the motives and justifications of these 
initiatives in the first instance. 
 
For example, why would one country provide assistance to police forces in another? Among the 
few studies that examine such a question (Aitchison 2007; Aitchison and Blaustein 2013; Isacson 
and Ball 2006; Marenin 1998), work by Huggins (1998) provides key insight into the Latin 
American context. By focusing on struggles over power, political influence and control of 
economic markets, Huggins (1998) examined the US–Brazil relationship during the Cold War, 
revealing the perverse outcomes of US international police assistance that included, among 
several factors, the development of police death squads in Brazil. In line with Bayley (1983), 
whose research was conducted in India, Huggins (1998) argued that international police 
assistance—particularly when it comes from the Global North—can often undermine democratic 
development in the Global South by supporting undemocratic governments. As both Huggins 
(1998) and Bayley (2006) note, international police assistance has often focused on police 
efficiency in regard to crime fighting rather than compliance with human rights. As such, despite 
claims that it aims to promote democracy or ‘democratic policing’ (Bayley 2006), it has 
consistently contributed to excess militarisation of police forces (Huggins 1998) and led to 
adverse consequences for the most vulnerable sectors of society. 
 
In summary, Huggins’ (1998) historical analysis revealed how international police assistance has 
promoted counter-democratic measures in Brazil and neglected the protection of human rights. 
Among other sources, Huggins (1998) examined archival materials from the US that had been 
declassified after 30 years under the Freedom of Information Act. More materials have been 
declassified since, providing further insight into the effects and geopolitical motivations of US 
police assistance in Brazil. This article utilises these recently declassified documents and includes 
the following sources: data from the US National Security Archives; minutes from US National 
Security Council (NSC) meetings and documents; a collection of interviews with US ambassadors 
to Brazil; data from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and data from the US Department of 
State Foreign Relations collection. Within these data are international government telegrams and 
transcripts of telephone conversations, among other sources. These collections (including 
declassified documents from 1964–1989) were accessed in 2015 at the Library of Congress and 
the National Security Archives in Washington, DC. The purpose of this archival investigation was 
to examine newly declassified material documenting instances of military and police assistance 
between the US and Brazil, building on investigative work conducted by Huggins (1998) more 
than 20 years prior. These newly collected data illustrate how the US has maintained influence in 
public security matters in Brazil and supported the continuation of militarised policing, often 
exacerbating existing challenges such as high levels of violence and resistance to police reform. 
 
By considering new evidence that documents the history of US police assistance to Brazil, this 
article pursues two key objectives: first, to address a geographical region (Latin America) largely 
overlooked by criminological studies and to contribute to growing calls for Southern 
Criminological research; and second, to consider the far-reaching effects of international police 
assistance programs and some of the geopolitical motivations that undergird these initiatives. In 
addressing these issues, the article contributes to policing and criminological theory by 
demonstrating that international police assistance often results in problematic crime-control 
strategies, where perceived threats and professed internal enemies take precedence over the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law. More precisely, international police assistance in 
Latin America has tended to reflect US political culture, benefitting the interests and profits of the 
US defence industry instead of the citizens in the country where assistance is provided. 
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This article then provides evidence to support these claims by considering important historical 
moments of international police assistance in Brazil. The data suggest that US influence 
strengthened the military dictatorship in the years 1964–1985, enabling the Brazilian military to 
intervene in public safety matters; a legacy that continues to the present day. This article 
demonstrates that once the Cold War ended—and limitations were placed on the provision of 
international police assistance in the US—US intervention then expanded to address 
narcotrafficking and the war on drugs. This article demonstrates how these models inhibit 
policing that is respectful of human rights and instead reinforce Brazil’s military style of law 
enforcement. 
 
The Origins of US Police Assistance to Brazil and the Military Dictatorship 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that on 31 March 1964, the Brazilian army overthrew leftist 
president João Goulart with the support of Brazilian economic and political elites and US military 
assistance (Huggins 1998; Pereira 2005; Pinheiro 1991). Examples of the reasons for US and 
corporate support included concerns with Goulart’s left-leaning initiatives, including passing a 
law limiting the number of profits that multinationals could transfer out of Brazil and failing to 
support sanctions against the Castro Government in Cuba (Blum 1986; Parker 1979). A 
declassified telephone conversation between US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President 
Lyndon Johnson, dated 30 March 1964, confirms US support for the military coup: 
 
Rusk: Mann and group here, including CIA, on this Brazilian situation. This crisis is 
coming to a head in the next day or two, perhaps even overnight. There is a 
snowballing of resistance to Goulart and therefore the thing may break at any 
moment. … I would like to send a message to Linc Gordon. I would like to read it to 
you, if I may, and then also indicate that I’ve asked Bob McNamara to get some 
tankers ready for some POL [petrol, oil and lubricants] supplies and things of that 
sort. (Geyer and Herschler 2004b) 
 
The US was prepared to support any government or military coup, as long as they were anti-
communist allies (Rabe 2012). The provision of military aid and cooperation between the US and 
Brazil was a key concern, one that dates back to the 1920s and 1930s (McCann 1974). During an 
interview conducted in 1989, former US ambassador to Brazil William Rountree (1970–1973) 
confirmed the nature of the US–Brazil relationship: 
 
We have maintained in Brazil, since 1922, a military mission that has been very 
important to us, and military facilities established during World War II have been 
continued in one form or another. Our military have cooperated in many respects 
over the years … I think our relations were at an absolute peak in 1972, the time of 
the visit of President Medici. (Rountree and Lowrie 1989: 50) 
 
In addition to military and political support, US assistance with training and directing 
international police forces in Brazil began during the first half of the twentieth century, with the 
objective of gaining political and ideological influence (Pinheiro 1991: 168). The US’s intention 
was to secure most-favoured-nation trading status with South American countries (Huggins 
1998: 35; McCann 1974). The US relied on Brazil as a source of important raw materials and as a 
consumer market for US products. According to ex-ambassador Lincoln Gordon, motivations for 
international police assistance to Brazil were predicated upon two key factors: ‘to keep the supply 
of military equipment in American hands rather than letting it be taken over by the Europeans’ 
and ‘our recognition, I think correctly, that the military are politically influential in Latin America’ 
(Gordon and Kennedy 1987: 25). 
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By the beginning of World War II, the US had already instituted firm relations with Latin American 
police forces through either direct military intervention or indirect political networks. During the 
war, the US penetrated Latin American police forces, providing training and assisting them to 
develop police structures (Huggins 1998: 62–64). By the end of the war, this strengthened 
apparatus would serve to monitor and repress communists and government opponents. 
 
Langguth documented this history in his book ‘Hidden Terrors’ (1978), providing a detailed 
account of US police interventions in Uruguay and Brazil during the Cold War. He recounted how 
Dan Mitrione, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent and advisor to the CIA in South 
America, was involved with the training of South American police. Mitrione was notorious for 
introducing new methods of torture (including the technique of applying electric shocks without 
killing the victim), which became routinely used by South American police forces. He is also 
known for introducing the system of nationwide identification cards that are still used in Brazil 
and Uruguay, which facilitated the surveillance and capture of subversives, communists, anti-
Americans and political opponents to the military. 
 
During this same period, the US NSC Operations Coordinating Board had the task of developing a 
program to eradicate the spread of communism. One way to achieve this was by urging Latin 
American governments to create national security laws1, which would enable countries to rule 
under state-of-siege, limiting civil and political rights (Huggins 1998). Political opponents and 
communists were considered subversives and were fiercely persecuted under these new national 
security laws. The new laws, in many cases, were also applied retroactively by the military. Some 
defendants were prosecuted more than once for the same offence, while crimes by the military 
regime and its security forces were ignored (Pereira 2005). 
 
Meanwhile, the US donated investigative equipment to the Institute of Criminalistics in Brazil 
through the Alliance for Progress, with the objective of facilitating the localisation of political 
adversaries (Zaverucha 2004). With US consent and assistance, many political prisoners were 
held in custody without trial and tortured. Recently declassified documents show that US officials 
were aware of human rights abuses in Brazil at that time, and even of the location of some political 
prisoners who had ‘disappeared’, yet the US Government did nothing to inform their families 
(Neri and Valente 2015). These US documents reveal information about political prisoners who 
died during or after torture and thus, were deemed ‘disappeared’, including Rubens Paiva (1929–
1971), Virgílio Gomes da Silva (1933–1969) and Stuart Edgard Angel Jones (1945–1971). Despite 
knowledge of these atrocities, the US continued to support and assist the Brazilian military 
regime and its police forces. This continued even in 1968, when the Brazilian military dictatorship 
established Institutional Act 5 (AI-5): a decree allowing the military leadership to overrule the 
constitution, censure the media, overrule the mandates of sitting politicians and suspend voting 
rights, leading to the institutionalisation of state torture. A recently declassified telegram from 
the US embassy in Brasília to the Department of State in Washington, DC, dated 14 December 
1968 (one day after AI-5 was issued), reveals why the US was idle despite this undemocratic 
legislation: 
 
These people [i.e., the military dictatorship], while nationalistic and narrow, are 
fundamentally favourable to the US and can be counted on to side with us either 
sentimentally or overtly in any East–West confrontation. It is highly likely they will 
continue in control of Brazil for a number of years to come. (Geyer and Herschler 
2004a) 
 
US secret services and international police assistance sought to eradicate communism in Brazil, 
but the institutions they facilitated, and supported, eradicated democracy and enabled a 
repressive dictatorship to remain in power for 21 years. Although a militarised branch of the 
police has existed in Brazil since 1808 (Holloway 1993), it was only during the last military 
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dictatorship that all branches of the police came under the direct control of the army. The civil 
police have since been responsible for investigations, while the military police have been 
responsible for patrolling the streets and repressing crime (Zaverucha 2000). This has enabled 
the police to become more effective in supressing public protest, strikes, rallies, political parades, 
political organisations, rebellions and emerging revolts (Pinheiro 1982). 
 
According to Pereira (2005: 16), Brazil’s military dictatorship was a ‘prototype for a new kind of 
authoritarianism in Latin America’, a model for other dictatorships that would develop across the 
region during the Cold War (e.g. Argentina in 1966, Chile in 1973 and Uruguay in 1973). These 
regimes claimed to defend ‘national security’ and prosecuted their opponents for offences against 
national security, yet all of them engaged in state terror—monitoring, torturing, killing and 
disappearing their own citizens—with the complicity of the US Government. The Brazilian 
military played a key role as well, providing aid, military training in counter-insurgent 
techniques, equipment, money and general backing to covertly interfere with electoral campaigns 
in Bolivia and Chile (Pereira 2005; Harmer 2012) and to support the US invasion of the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 (Blum 1986). Through its alliance with Brazil, the US could provide assistance 
to anti-leftist and military dictatorships throughout Latin America. This alliance was further 
strengthened under the US President Nixon (1969–74): 
 
In the case of Chile where Nixon told Médici [Brazil’s then military president and 
ex-military attaché to Washington] how important it was to ‘work closely’, ‘if 
money were required or other discrete aid’, Nixon continued, ‘we might be able to 
make it available … we must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try 
where possible to reverse these trends’. (Harmer 2012: 670) 
 
A recently declassified memorandum from the CIA, entitled ‘Brazil–Suriname: The Success of the 
Brazilian Initiative’ (CIA 1983), reveals the extent of Brazil’s role in providing military aid 
throughout Latin America. This was justified through the ideology of fighting communism and 
curbing Cuba’s potential influence. Despite being sanitised, the document reveals how the CIA 
positively interpreted its collaboration with Brazil to run successful interference in Suriname: 
 
According to our Embassy, Brazilian Ambassador Lampreia was working directly 
and virtually on a daily basis with Alibux and Graanoogst to implement Brazilian 
assistance packages. [Sanitised section] For their part, the Surinamers have made 
numerous requests for Brazilian assistance in diverse areas ranging from 
academic scholarships to helicopter flight training. The embassy in Brasilia reports 
the Brazilians generally are pleased with the positive response from Paramaribo 
and are optimistic about their prospects for supplanting the Cubans. (CIA 1983: 2–
3) 
 
What stands out when considering these newly declassified documents are the geopolitical 
motivations behind US support for Brazil’s military dictatorship, as well as the methods by which 
this support was achieved. For example, researchers have known for years that the US leant 
support to authoritarian dictatorships in South America (Huggins 1998; Pereira 2005), but what 
these new data reveal are the key roles of international police assistance in this process. 
Cornerstone here were links between the US and Brazil—a relationship motivated largely by two 
interconnected factors: the US defence industry’s desire to maintain its monopoly on Latin 
American markets, and to prevent the growth of communism in the region. Such tactics were 
justified by US officials, mostly on account of the Cold War. But as dictatorships in South America 
grew more brutal during the 1970s, such close ties became harder to justify for US policymakers. 
When direct political interference became less tenable, a new collaborative frontier emerged to 
sustain links between public security in South America and the US: the war on drugs and 
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combating narcotrafficking in Latin America. Again, much like during the Cold War, international 
police assistance played a key role in this process. 
 
From Fighting Communism to the War on Drugs 
 
In the late 1960s, international concern with the brutality of the military regimes in Latin America 
was increasing. An extensive number of NSC meetings from 1969, declassified over 30 years later, 
reveal continued discussions about whether the US should continue to aid Latin American 
militaries, and if not, how assistance should be terminated or made less visible. This is reflected 
in the following comments by Henry Kissinger, US secretary of state under President Nixon, in a 
NSC meeting regarding Latin America dated 9th July 1969: 
 
Internal security forces have improved, but some countries still need budgetary 
and technical help. On the other hand, Congress is becoming increasingly opposed 
to military programs in Latin America. … at present, there is no wholly satisfactory 
internal substitute for AID lending … But by being so ‘visible’ it also maximizes the 
amount of direct friction and resentment against the US. (NSC 1969: 6–8) 
 
Two US Senate hearings by Frank Church in 1972, and by James Abourezk in 1973, disclosed 
increasing proof of torture, killings and disappearances made by police who were trained and 
resourced with US assistance (Huggins 1998). In 1974, Amnesty International published a 
damning report titled ‘Report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil’, and during that same year, 
Congress banned further US assistance to foreign police. However, by then, Brazilian security 
forces—and their death squads—were well established and excessively militarised. Further, 
there existed a number of exceptions to the police assistance ban. Although Congress banned 
further US assistance to foreign police, narcotics control was exempt from this sanction. In this 
way, Latin America continued to receive resources via new mechanisms connected to narcotics 
control rather than direct police aid. 
 
By the mid-1980s, as democracy began returning to South America, foreign police training to 
combat terrorism was reinstated by the US. Assistance to foreign police forces was also made 
available through various exemptions to Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act and is not 
supervised by Congress (Bayley 2001). This was made possible through different privatised 
programs, allowing US police assistance programs to re-emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. These 
programs allow for state invisibility by becoming less accountable to Congress and by being 
contracted out to non-governmental organisations and private groups (Huggins 1998). 
 
Despite limitations placed on international police assistance—or perhaps because of it—the 
Brazilian military and military police were granted impunity with a constitutional amendment on 
13 April 1977. Known as ‘o pacote de abril’ (literally, the April package), the police, rather than 
being subject to civilian penal codes of conduct, were placed under the same code of penal 
conduct as the Brazilian military. Crimes committed by the military (and by extension the military 
police) were to be judged in the military’s own courts, and those courts would in most cases 
establish that the officers were not guilty as they were following orders or simply ‘did the job they 
had to do’. As such, the military police, while performing a civil service, continue to be protected 
by military law as if the country was at war. Extrajudicial tactics were also implemented and 
intensified at this time and included torture, punitive maltreatment and executions (Pinheiro 
1982). News reports from the dictatorship era reveal cases of torture and execution and 
confirmed cases of death squad activity, often formed by active or ex-police officers (Freire 1980). 
In the state of Pernambuco, for example, the Commission of Justice and Peace of the Archdiocese 
of Olinda and Recife highlighted these issues in 1979: 
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Public opinion in Pernambuco is perplexed, following news reports of successive 
discoveries of corpses with no identification [documentation], usually in deserted 
places, crimes that the police have not solved. Beyond having marks that indicate 
barbarity, these corpses have a number of common characteristics: they are 
usually young, between 18 and 25 years old, they are partially burned, with marks 
of handcuffs or ropes, they are naked, or semi-naked, very slim and with long facial 
hair, as if before dying they had been kept in captivity for a long time. (Freire 1980: 
20) 
 
Beyond supporting such activities, international police assistance contributed to continuously 
enforcing militarised models of social control. For instance, a recently declassified report from 
the US Department of State cites the chief of federal police, Romeu Tuma—formerly head of the 
Brazilian Secret Service (1972), whose job was to assist the military’s restriction of political 
freedom by infiltrating leftist student and labour groups (Riding 1985)—revealing US pressure 
to involve the Brazilian army in counter-narcotics activities: 
 
[Brazil’s] Federal police chief Romeu Tuma asked the mission to confirm press 
reports that the US is ‘pressuring’ the Brazilian military to enter the anti-drug 
effort. Our DCM assured him that the reports were not correct, although the US 
military does note to its Brazilian counterparts the role it plays in the US effort and 
that this role makes an important contribution. (Department of State 1990) 
 
Such discourses about narcotics and the control of organised crime came to replace Cold War 
ideologies of national security (Hinton 2006; Huggins 1998). Meanwhile, the military was 
pressured to become involved with police work, and the police continued to be equipped with 
militarised equipment and training. Several files from the US Agency for International 
Development (AID) show evidence of continued US support for Brazil’s military regime, which 
was provided under the pretence of fighting the war on drugs. An illustrative example comes from 
the Office of the General Counsel, AID/W, dated 5 December 1975, by Charles J. Knowlen: 
 
‘International Narcotics Control’: The enclosed agreement provides US$120,000 
for laboratory equipment to the Federal Police Department, to help develop a basic 
narcotic identification capability in eight selected regions of Brazil. (AID 1975) 
 
While US influence over international crime control is well documented (Garland 2001; Jones and 
Newburn 2007; Macaulay 2013; Wacquant 1999), what this new evidence reveals are some of the 
processes used to export US crime-control practices under controversial circumstances. The 
dismantling of the US foreign police assistance program, and the closing of the Office for Public 
Safety in 1974, did not end US support for military forces in South America. A number of recently 
declassified materials, now available at the ‘Digital National Security Archive’ (under collections 
such as the ‘CIA Covert Operations 1977–2010’), provide ample evidence of ongoing US 
intervention in Latin America. For instance, in the minutes of a NSC Meeting on 13 March 1987, 
President Reagan argued: 
 
Lenin discussed their approach to world communism and said that they would first 
take Eastern Europe, which they have already done. Then, they would organize the 
hordes of Asia. Well, they have made great progress there. Then they would move 
to Latin America. In taking Latin America, the United States, the last bastion of 
imperialism, would be isolated and fall into their hands like overripe fruit. These 
are the stakes we are talking about today. (NSC 1987) 
 
The anti-communism agenda had not been dismantled, despite emerging concerns with new 
threats—namely, drugs. Continued intervention was justified under the cover of fighting old and 
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new threats: communism, terrorism and narcotics. Following international reports about the 
increasing involvement of the Brazilian military with torture and human rights abuses, 
international police aid continued through less visible means. A memorandum for Zbigniew 
Brzezinski (US National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977–1981), dated 21 
April 1978 and declassified in 2008 by the NSC, reveals the secrecy around state-run, extra-legal 
intervention in politics through US police assistance to Brazil: 
 
Steve Oxman from Christopher’s office called about whether to approve three 
different licenses for equipment to the Brazilian police. D/HA strongly opposes the 
sale; I am inclined to recommend going ahead with it, though I recognize it may 
cause us some problems, particularly the $15 million fingerprint detecting 
equipment. (NSC 1978) 
 
Another confidential report from the NSC, entitled ‘Issues and Objectives for the President’s Visit 
to Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica’, dated 22 November 1982 and declassified in 2009, further 
illustrates this point: 
 
In Central America, guerrilla warfare persists, but we have stopped the drift 
toward Marxism/Leninism. … We should, however, guard against appearing to 
suggest publicly that we are interested in a special military relationship with 
Brazil. (NSC 1982) 
 
In 1986, the US Government created another agency for the provision of international police 
assistance, called the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, funded 
by AID (Bayley 2001). Both the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration were also involved 
in training and resourcing international police, with the alleged aim of promoting ‘democracy’ 
and ensuring ‘a safe environment abroad for market economies’ (Bayley 2001: 3). Among 184 
recipient countries of this aid in the 1990s, 15 were in Latin America and accounted for nearly 
half of all investment (Bayley 2001). Given this context, it is hardly surprising that US models of 
crime control continue to prevail in Latin America. 
 
There is also continuity in this international project, insofar as militarised methods of policing 
(including militarised equipment and training) have continuously been deployed despite 
reforms. As Leeds (2014) notes, the continued exportation of militarised methods of crime 
control to police forces that are not trained in respectful civil relations and human rights 
protection is deeply problematic: 
 
In March of this year [2014], 22 Brazilians from the Military and Federal Police 
went to the North Carolina headquarters of Academi, formerly known as the 
infamous Blackwater, for a three-week training course paid for by the US 
government, apparently with Defence Department funding. According to a São 
Paulo Police official, the training was intended ‘to learn the practical experiences 
of the American troops fighting terrorism’. Additionally, with training specifically 
focused on ‘civil disturbances’, more than 800 Brazilian police from nine states 
participated in training by the FBI in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Ceará, 
and Brasília. While the Brazilian Police claim they respect the right to protest 
peacefully, they clearly were not able to distinguish between peaceful and violent 
protesters. (Leeds 2014, unpaged) 
 
The Brazilian police and criminal justice system are still unable to promote equality before the 
law, engage in due process or even distinguish between suspects and criminals (Cavalcanti 2017; 
Leeds 2014). In authoritarian regimes, the police enforce security and conduct investigations by 
instilling fear. Frequently, this is done through brute and unrestricted force (Uildriks 2009: 16), 
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often using torture—which is, of course, unwarranted in democratic regimes, but nevertheless 
continues to persist (Zaverucha 2004: 34). Academic research and recent media reports bear 
evidence of this: for example, the recent kidnapping and torture of a law student by civil police in 
Recife; torture tools found in a Pernambucan prison; and cases of torture in young people’s 
detention centres (Cavalcanti 2011; Machado 2011; Jornal do Comercio 2013). The penultimate 
section of this article shows how state crimes like these, along with abuses of human rights 
(including the use of torture) continue to be routine in Brazil (Macaulay 2013) and show ongoing 
connections to international police assistance provided by the US. 
 
Legacies of Control 
 
The consequences of the military dictatorship are lasting. The Brazilian military continue to be 
influential in the country’s public security apparatus, with many generals occupying positions of 
leadership in the secretariats of public security of various states, and the army being increasingly 
present in public life and called in to control public order (Aranda 2015; Harig 2014; Soares 2000; 
Zaverucha 2000). This means that despite Brazil’s return to democracy in the 1980s—and the 
notably progressive constitution of 1988—Brazilian public security and policing remain 
unreformed and reveal the legacy US police assistance and the military’s ongoing influence. 
 
Other factors may also be connected to this. The continuation of undemocratic methods of 
policing and of the ineffectiveness of reforms in Brazil can only be understood in the context of 
ongoing, deep social inequality and asymmetrical power relations. Brazilians have constitutional 
rights to justice, but in practice, access to justice is deeply unequal (Holston and Caldeira 1998; 
Gregori 2010). Additionally, police reform in most parts of Brazil, to date, has not focused on 
demilitarising the police, or succeeded in making the police more respectful of citizens’ rights. 
Rather, they have espoused the goal of making the police more effective at capturing criminals 
and apprehending narcotics (Cavalcanti 2017). 
 
There is also the issue of public security organisation and management, which again reflects 
legacies of the military dictatorship and international police assistance. For example, the Brazilian 
Military Police, although now under civilian control, are divided into military ranks, 
institutionally beset by a rigid military hierarchy and ideology, and military culture and training. 
They continue to be subject to the military, rather than civilian, penal code, which can enforce 
severe penalties and detention on officers who do not obey orders, regardless of whether these 
orders are consistent with democratic ideals (Soares 2000; Cubas 2013). Simultaneously, military 
courts can acquit police for crimes that a civilian court may not (Mingardi 2000). Additionally, 
despite continuous abuses of force, direct US influence over Brazilian crime control has 
continued. In March 2015, for example, the FBI provided questioning and interrogation training 
to the Secretariat of Social Defence in Pernambuco, Brazil (Diario de Pernambuco 2015). This 
enduring US involvement, and the replication of US models of public security, is concerning, given 
the historical consequences of international police assistance in Brazil. 
 
In addition to a legacy of undemocratic policing, Brazil continues to rely on heavy-handed public 
security measures, with the military often being called upon to interfere with law and order. For 
instance, in May 2014, leading up to the presidential election, the Pernambucan police went on 
strike demanding better pay, a practice that is illegal but recurrent in Brazil since the police are 
not legally entitled to strike. During the strike, the army was called in to control sprawling crime 
and looting. Tanks and heavily armed soldiers patrolled streets, pointing their guns at unarmed 
citizens in scenes that shortly thereafter went viral in Brazil (these images have been widely 
disseminated on the web; see Julio 2014; Madeiro 2014). The army is also often called on to 
control protests and strikes without having to account for its actions. This is problematic on 
several levels; not least for making demilitarisation in Brazil more difficult. It also mars the 
democratic nature of state institutions, notes Zaverucha (2000: 26): ‘treating crime as a military 
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problem rather than a social problem, which only helps to strengthen the military presence in the 
political arena, making it more difficult to address the problem through structural changes’. 
 
Where do the roots of such problems lie in Brazil? As this article has demonstrated, one cannot 
overlook Brazil’s links with the US and the history of international police assistance from the 
1960s to the 1980s. Such legacies, of course, are not exclusive to Brazil, highlighting the need for 
Southern Criminology research that considers similar contexts (Carrington et al. 2019a). 
Likewise, it needs to be remembered that crime control in Brazil is not overdetermined by US 
pressures. Also significant (to list but a few factors) is severe social inequality; the ways Brazilian 
elites have resisted social change for centuries; Brazil’s legacy of colonialism and slavery; a 
racialised social order masked by myths of racial democracy; and inconsistent public security 
measures espoused by different political parties (Azevedo and Cifali, 2015). Further, governance 
processes are shifting in Brazil and much political influence is now achieved by the judiciary 
instead of the armed forces. A growing body of literature explores this trend; what could be called 
the politicisation of justice and the judicialisation of politics (Lopes 2011; Santos 2003). This is 
perhaps best exemplified by recent investigations into members of the Workers’ Party and the 
imprisonment of former president Lula, who, according to opinion polls, was the favoured 
candidate to win the 2018 elections (Garmany and Pereira 2019). By accounting for this 
context—and again, remembering serious concerns over public security that are ubiquitous in 
contemporary Brazilian society—it is easier to make sense of Jair Bolsonaro’s surprise victory in 
2018. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The rise of right-wing political figures like Brazil’s Bolsonaro, rather than representing new 
political agendas or a decisive turn in Latin American politics, instead reveal long-rooted histories 
of authoritarian governance and punitive public security measures. This legacy dates back 
centuries, yet became especially pronounced during Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985). 
Not only have the Brazilian Military Police never been significantly reformed, but the methods for 
engaging public security and everyday policing also continue to reflect militarised tactics and low 
levels of public accountability. Debates regarding whether Brazil’s police should undergo reform, 
or in fact engage in even more heavy-handed tactics, continue to divide the Brazilian electorate, 
just as in many countries throughout the Global South. For many in Brazil today, policing is violent 
work, meaning that solutions to mounting public security problems necessitate higher levels of 
violence and fewer concerns for due process and human rights. This, after all, was how public 
security was maintained during the military dictatorship, which, today, is celebrated by leaders 
like Bolsonaro for allegedly producing higher levels of public security. Bolsonaro has drawn 
effectively on this sentiment, and his calls for authoritarian public security measures—though 
horrific to many—increasingly seem to connect with Brazilian voters. 
 
This article has considered the intersections between international police assistance and public 
security issues in Brazil and other similar contexts. By engaging with recently declassified 
documents showing how the US Government sought to influence South American politics through 
international police assistance programs, this article shows how US interference was 
implemented over several years, stretching from the Cold War to the war on drugs. The evidence 
here reveals specific geopolitical motivations, as well as long-lasting consequences of this work, 
with a specific focus on legacies of militarised policing in countries like Brazil. The purpose of this 
investigation has been, first, to contribute to emergent research on Southern Criminology by 
highlighting key issues in a region often overlooked by criminologists in the Global North; and, 
second, to explore the broader effects of international police assistance programs. By highlighting 
these issues, this article seeks to make a lasting contribution to studies of policing, politics and 
public security in contexts like Brazil, where levels of everyday violence reveal crises of human 
rights and democracy. 
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Going forward, important questions remain regarding the roles and long-term consequences of 
international police assistance programs. Related to this are numerous ‘blind spots’ with respect 
to criminological research in the Global South and the problems with implementing public 
security measures promoted by countries like the US. This is not to suggest the US is to blame for 
all Brazil’s public security problems, but rather to draw attention to the effects of ongoing wars 
on communism, drugs or terror. For example, when international police assistance is uncritically 
extended to regions that are characterised by weak democratic institutions and low levels of 
external police oversight, the consequences, in some cases, can produce even higher levels of 
police brutality (Chevigny 1995). These are the broader ramifications of the issues considered in 
this article and are worthy of further exploration and critical reflection. 
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1The first new security law (Ato Institucional, AI-1), disseminated on 9 April 1964, postponed Brazil’s presidential 
elections, reduced congressional powers and established conditions by which one’s political rights could be cancelled. 
On 26 October 1965, AI-2 declared the executive’s right to rule without congressional consent, established indirect 
presidential elections, controlled by the military and established that although state governors could be directly 
elected, only candidates from the two parties approved by the military could run for office (Aliança de Renovação 
Nacional (ARENA) and Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (MDB)). In 1968, the Fifth Institutional Act granted 
extreme freedom to security forces by eradicating habeas corpus. Political killings and repression increased with the 
establishment of this new security law, which was only eradicated in 1974 with regime liberalisation. Military 
arbitrariness had, by then, been temporarily legalised in Brazil. 
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